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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL J. HILLYARD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY, 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 15964 
N1ICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF STATEWIDE ASSOCIATION OF 
PROSECUTORS OF UTAH ON REHEARING IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
* * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action brought by the Plaintiff 
seeking a Writ of Prohibition. The District Court in Cache 
County, State of Utah, granted the Writ of Prohibition and 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on the 18th day of 
April, 1978 upheld the Judgment of the District Court. 
The amicus curiae brief herein respectfully sub-
mitted seeks the relief of reversal of the Court's prior 
decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As to the purpose of this brief, the statement 
of facts contained in the briefs of the Appellant are 
relied upon. 
For the information of the Court, the Statewide 
Association of Prosecutors filing this amicus curiae brief 
is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the 
State of Utah comprised of all prosecutors throughout the 
State. 
The Prosecutors' Advisory Board comprised of five 
county attorneys, the Attorney General, and a representative 
from the city attorneys' offices have unanimously concurred 
in the filing of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF HILLYARD FAILS TO GIVE EFFECT TO 
THE EXPRESS MEANING OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTES. 
A. The Legislature has consistently attempted 
to provide the option that misdemeanors may be filed in the 
City Court. An historical review of the Sections related 
to the subject follows. 
Section 77-13-17, U.C.A., as amended, states: 
"When an arrest is made without a warrant 
by a peace officer or private person, the 
person arrested must, without unnecessary 
delay, be taken to the magistrate in the 
precinct of the county or city in which the 
offense occurred, and a complaint stating 
the charge against the person must be made 
before such magistrate. In the event the 
-2-
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magistrate of the precinct is not avail-
able, the arrested person shall be taken 
before the nearest available magistrate 
to the scene of the alleged offense. A 
conductor or other person who makes an 
arrest as provided in Section 77-13-5 
shall without unnecessary delay take the 
person so arrested before any accessible 
magistrate or deliver him to a peace officer; 
and a complaint stating the charge against 
the person must be made. The magistrate 
before whom such a charge is made, if the 
offense is tryable by him, shall have full 
jurisdiction over the offense and the defen-
dant to try and determine such offense. If 
he has not jurisdiction to try the defendant 
for the offense charged, he must proceed 
as provided in Chapter 15 of this Title. 
Any officer or person violating any of the 
provisions of this Section shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor." 
It's evident this statute requires the defendant to 
be taken to the precinct in the county or city where the 
offense occurred. It also provides that where the magis-
trate in the precinct is not available, the defendant can be 
taken to the nearest available magistrate. The purpose of 
this statute is to prevent judge shopping by peace officers. 
It is obvious that officers may "shop" for the "most avail-
able" Justice of the Peace when such Justices maintain 
irregular hours. 
The Legislature, realizing that problems could 
arise for the prosecution and for defendants facing non 
law-trained Justices when such defendants were taken only 
before the local magistrate, provided in Section 78-4-16.5, 
U.C.A., as enacted in 1971, the option to have the 
criminal proceeding commence before a city court. The 
-3-
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Statute reads as follows: 
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced before 
a magistrate under Section 77-57-2, or an 
arrested person is to be taken before a magis-
trate under Section 77-13-17, the complaint 
may be commenced or the arrested person may 
be taken before the nearest city court judge 
in counties where city courts have been 
established." 
The option of going before the city court was 
effectively curtailed in the case of Wells vs. City Court 
of Logan City, 535 P.2d 683 (Utah 1975), where the Court said 
that the provisions of Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., as amended 
in 1953, required that a defendant be taken to the nearest 
magistrate and that that magistrate had exclusive juris-
diction. Section 41-6-166 prior to 1975 did not identify 
the purpose for which the person was taken before the magis-
trate implying that the magistrate was granted full juris-
diction over the case and was the party before whom the case 
should be tried. Following the Wells decision, the Utah 
Legislature amended Section 41-6-166 clearly making known 
their intention to only require the appearance to be 
" ... for the purpose of setting bond". 
The effect of this change restored the option of 
Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A., allowing proceedings to be begun 
either in the magistrate's court or in the city court as 
determined by the arresting officer or the prosecutor. 
unfortunately, in the recent Hillyard decision, 
the Court failed to follow the expressed meaning of Section 
41-6-166, U.C.A., as amended, and instead chose to follow 
-4-
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the Wells decision under the former Section 41-6-166, u.C.A., 
statute. 
B. The majority of the Court held in Hillyard 
that Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., was the controlling statute 
because it was later and more specific as compared to Section 
78-4-16.5, U.C.A., (1971), and Section 77-13-17, U.C.A., 
(1971), which are more general statutes. However, the reason 
Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., is later is only because it was 
amended in 1975 to add in the words " ••. for the purpose of 
setting bond". 
The amendment was clearly an intention by the 
Legislature to clarify its belief that matters needed only 
be taken before the magistrate for the purpose of setting 
bond, but there was an option later for trial before the 
city courts. 
The Hillyard decision throws out the option of 
Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A. allowing the matter to be taken 
before the city courts which was the express intent of the 
Legislature when it amended Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., for 
the purpose of allowing that option following the Wells 
decision. 
c. Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., is located in the 
traffic rules and regulations provisions of the Code and 
provides for an appearance before a magistrate for the 
purpose of taking bond (emphasis added) • This is to in-
sure procedural due process is provided the individual and 
he is taken immediately, if he desires, before an appropriate 
-5-
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magistrate. 
The requirement in the statute to appear does not 
1 
include the requirement to file a formal complaint or the 
commencement of the proceedings or the anticipation of con-
ferring exclusive jurisdiction on the magistrate to try the 
case. 
Exclusive jurisdiction begins at the time the 
complaint is filed before the appropriate court. 
The clear Legislative intent throughout these 
series of statutes has been to provide the opportunity for 
defendants to be tried before a law-trained judge with the 
highest level of skill and experience. To attach exclusive 
jurisdiction to the magistrate upon the initial appearance 
of the defendant simply frustrates this Legislative intent. 
POINT II. 
THE HILLYARD DECISION FRUSTRATES THE PURPOSE OF THE 
CIRCUIT COURT ACT. 
The problems spoken of above are further compounded 
when the new Circuit Court Act having taken effect July 1, 
1978 is considered. The Circuit Court Act gives jurisdictioo 
to each circuit over all misdemeanors except that complaints i 
dealing with Title 41 (Traffic Violations) excluding drunk 
driving and reckless driving charges are retained to be 
filed before the municipal justice of the peace where the 
offense occurred. The Act also allows the option to commence 
a complaint before any Circuit Court Judge in the county in 
which the offense occurred. 
-6-
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The provision Section 78-4-5, U.C.A., as amended, 
dealing with the Circuit Courts incorporates the language 
of Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A., with the exception of changing 
the language to allow the matter to be brought before the 
Circuit Court rather than the City Judge. The critical 
language is in paragraph one thereof which states, 
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced before 
a magistrate under Section 77-57-2 where an 
arrested person is to be taken before a magis-
trate under Section 77-13-17, the complaint 
may be commenced or the arrested person may 
be taken before any circuit court judge in 
the county or the just~ce of the peace in 
the county in whose precinct the events 
occurred .•. " (emphasis added) 
This, of course, is obviously similar to the 
language used under the prior Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A., 
which was the law prior to July 1, 1978. 
The Hillyard case will affect the application of 
the new Circuit Court Act just as it would affect the city 
courts by defeating the possibility of bringing the defen-
dant before the circuit court if the offense occurred in 
a precinct where a justice presided. 
The problem can be resolved if the court in 
reconsidering the Hillyard decision will consider the 
language in Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., providing that the 
defendant appear before the nearest magistrate "for the 
purpose of setting bond" only and then allow the trial to 
commenced before the circuit court. 
-7-
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Section 78-4-2, U.C.A., 1953, as amended in 1977, 
dealing with the circuit courts states that the act should be 
liberally construed to accomplish the purpose of providing 
full-time professional judicial service to every county. 
The Court's reversal of the Hillyard decision would 
accomplish this obviously recent Legislative desire. 
POINT III. 
THE INTEREST OF PROSECUTORS OF UTAH AND ALL CON-
CERNED PARTIES WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY INTERPRETING THE 
CURRENT LEGISLATION ALLOv7ING THESE MATTERS TO BE TRIED BEFORE 
THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
Under Section 78-5-4, U .C.A. 1953, as amended 1957, 
any person charged with an offense that carries a possible 
jail sentence has a right to request that the proceeding 
be handled by a judge who is a member of the Utah State Bar. 
Witness the language: 
"Notwithstanding any provision of this Code 
relating to jurisdiction or venue of justice 
courts, in any matter in which the judge has 
the option of imposing a jail sentence, the 
defendant may demand and shall be accorded 
the right to have his case tried before a 
judge who is a member of the Utah State Bar". 
Combining this statute with the Hillyard decision illustrates 
the problem. For example, the prosecutor will be forced to 
file the case before the magistrate where the initial appea~ 
ance was had for the purpose of setting bond. Then the 
defendant can made a demand for a law-trained judge thus in-
creasing the time and expenses of the proceedings. The 
prosecutor runs the additional risk that he may have multiple 
-8-
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trialsthroughout the county in various locals and often 
distant precincts. 
On the other hand, under the interpretation of the 
statutes as advanced by this brief, the prosecutor would 
initially file before the law-trained judge the action. 
This would increase the effectiveness of the system and its 
efficiency. After June 1978 if the Hillyard decision were 
reversed, drunk driving cases would be filed in the Circuit 
Courts providing the use of full-time, law-trained judges 
and increasing the professional level of the Utah Judicial 
System. This advantage is lost if prosecutions are not 
allowed to be initiated in the Circuit Court after the defen-
dant is taken before the magistrate court for the purpose 
of setting bond. 
It becomes obvious immediately the difficulties 
prosecutors face when these matters may be filed before 
multiple courts where justices of the peace preside. The 
problem is more complex for the rural counties than for 
the urban counties; and traditionally, rural prosecutors 
are paid less than urban prosecutors and face the tremendous 
strain of a greatly-increased workload. 
Also, strictly reading the language of the Hillyard 
decision, if jurisdiction exclusively attaches in the magis-
trate court, how can the defendant qualify for a law-trained 
judge? The matter cannot be transferred if the exclusive 
jurisdiction exists. 
-9-
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CONCLUSIOn 
In conclusion, the Statewide Association of 
Prosecutors respectfully submits that the proper application 
of the broad legal principles applied herein would require 
the reversal of the Hillyard decision and allow the in-
fluence of the Circuit Court Act to consider these difficult 
motor vehicle violations for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY 31st day of July, 1978, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a conforming copy of 
the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mr. George W. Preston 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Gordon J. Low, Esquire 
HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
175 East First North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
this 1st day of August, 197 
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